


Introduction to Mathematics



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Outline

- Galois field
- Homomorphism and isomorphism
- Hypotheses test
- T-test

Galois Field:

Fields with a **finite** number of elements are called **Finite Fields** or **Galois Fields** and abbreviated as **GF**.

When p is prime, the residue class \mathbb{Z}_p is a field that is represented as $GF(p)$, and commonly referred to as the **prime field**.

When $p = 2$, this field $GF(2)$ is called the **binary field** and is popular for fast and efficient implementations.

Galois Field:

Let f be a polynomial in \mathbb{Z}_p , of degree n , the polynomial is **irreducible**, if it cannot be factored into polynomials, g and h which are polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$ of positive degree.

The **irreducible polynomials** can be imagined to correspond to **prime numbers** in the domain of integers.

Galois Field:

Example: The polynomial $f(x) = x^2 + x + 1$ is **irreducible** in $\mathbb{Z}_2[x]$.
Assume $f(x) = g(x)h(x)$. Since

$$\deg(f(x)) = \deg(h(x)) + \deg(g(x))$$

then

$$\deg(g(x)) = \deg(h(x)) = 1 \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_2[x].$$

Thus $f(0) = 0$ or $f(1) = 0$, but $f(0) \neq 0$ and $f(1) \neq 0$

Hence, the polynomial $f(x)$ is **irreducible**.

Galois Field:

Theorem: For a non-constant polynomials $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[x]$, the ring $\frac{\mathbb{Z}_p[x]}{\langle f(x) \rangle}$ is a field if and only if $f(x)$ is irreducible in $\mathbb{Z}_p[x]$.

Consider a field K and $f(x)$ irreducible over K . Then, $L = \frac{K[x]}{\langle f(x) \rangle}$ is a field extension.

$GF(p^n)$ is an extension of $GF(p)$.

Extension of a Field:

Consider $GF(2^2) = \frac{GF(2)[x]}{\langle f(x) \rangle}$,

where $f(x) = x^2 + x + 1$ is an irreducible polynomial in $GF(2)[x]$.

$GF(2^2)$ is an **extension** field of $GF(2)$.

Theorem: Every non-constant **polynomial** over a field **has** a **root** in some **extension field**.

$GF(2^m)$ is known as **binary extension finite fields** or **binary finite fields**.

$GF(2^m)$

Advantages:

- Modern computer systems are built on the binary number system.
- With m bits all possible elements of $GF(2^m)$ can be represented.
- The simple hardware required for computation of some of the commonly used arithmetic operations such as addition and squaring.

Addition in binary extension fields can be easily performed by a simple XOR. There is no carry generated.

Squaring in this field is a linear operation and can also be done using XOR circuits.

$GF(2^m)$

The polynomial

$$a(x) = a_0 + a_1x + \cdots + a_{m-1}x^{m-1} + a_mx^m$$

is a **polynomial over $GF(2)$** if


$$a_0, a_1, \cdots, a_{m-1}, a_m \in GF(2).$$

Let $f(x)$ be an **irreducible polynomial** of **degree m** over $GF(2)$, then

$$GF(2^m) = \frac{GF(2)}{\langle f(x) \rangle}.$$

Hence, all elements of $GF(2^m)$ can be represented by polynomials of degree $m - 1$ over $GF(2)$.

Representation of element of $GF(2^m)$



we can represent the 8-bit word (10011001) using a polynomials

and vice versa the polynomial $x^5 + x^2 + x$ can be represented by the word **00100110**

Since $n = 8$, the expanded polynomial is

$$0x^7 + 0x^6 + 1x^5 + 0x^4 + 0x^3 + 1x^2 + 1x^1 + 0x^0 \longrightarrow 00100110$$

Addition in $GF(2^m)$

Let $a(x), b(x) \in GF(2^m)$ be denoted by

$$a(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} a_i x^i \quad b(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} b_i x^i,$$

$$a(x) + b(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} (a_i + b_i) x^i.$$

Here the + between

Example: Let $a(x) = x^5 + x^2 + x$ and $b(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1$ then

$$a(x) + b(x) = (x^5 + x^2 + x) + (x^3 + x^2 + 1) \text{ in } GF(2^8)$$

Representation of $x^5 + x^2 + x$ is 00100110 and of $x^3 + x^2 + 1$ is 00001101 so

$$\begin{array}{r} 00100110 \\ \oplus 00001101 \\ \hline 00101011 \end{array}$$

Multiplication in $GF(2^m)$

Multiplication is **not** as **trivial** as addition or squaring.

The product of the two polynomials $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ is given by

$$a(x).b(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} b(x)a_i x^i \pmod{p(x)}$$

Most multiplication algorithms are $O(n^2)$.

Inversion is the most complex of all field operations.

Even the best technique to implement inversion is several times more complex than multiplication.

Multiplication in $GF(2^m)$

Example: Let $P_1 = x^5 + x^2 + x$ and $P_2 = x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x$ find $P_1 \times P_2$ in $GF(2^8)$ with **irreducible** polynomial $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_1 \otimes P_2 &= x^5(x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x) + x^2(x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x) + x(x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x) \\
 P_1 \otimes P_2 &= x^{12} + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^9 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^8 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 \\
 P_1 \otimes P_2 &= (x^{12} + x^7 + x^2) \bmod (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) = x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1
 \end{aligned}$$

Divide the polynomial of degree 12 by the polynomial of degree 8 (the modulus) and **keep only the remainder**

$$\begin{array}{r}
 x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \overline{) \begin{array}{l} x^{12} + x^7 + x^2 \\ x^{12} + x^8 + x^7 + x^5 + x^4 \\ \hline x^8 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 \\ x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \\ \hline \end{array} \\
 \text{Remainder} \quad \boxed{x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1}
 \end{array}$$

Multiplication in $GF(2^m)$

We first find the partial result of multiplying x^0, x^1, x^2, x^3, x^4 and x^5 by P_2 . Note that each calculation depends on the previous result.

<i>Powers</i>	<i>Operation</i>	<i>New Result</i>	<i>Reduction</i>
$x^0 \otimes P_2$		$x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x$	No
$x^1 \otimes P_2$	$x \otimes (x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x)$	$x^5 + x^2 + x + 1$	Yes
$x^2 \otimes P_2$	$x \otimes (x^5 + x^2 + x + 1)$	$x^6 + x^3 + x^2 + x$	No
$x^3 \otimes P_2$	$x \otimes (x^6 + x^3 + x^2 + x)$	$x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2$	No
$x^4 \otimes P_2$	$x \otimes (x^7 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2)$	$x^5 + x + 1$	Yes
$x^5 \otimes P_2$	$x \otimes (x^5 + x + 1)$	$x^6 + x^2 + x$	No
$P_1 \times P_2 = (x^6 + x^2 + x) + (x^6 + x^3 + x^2 + x) + (x^5 + x^2 + x + 1) = x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$			

Multiplication in $GF(2^m)$

We have $P_1 = 000100110$, $P_2 = 10011110$, modulus = 100011010 (nine bits). We show the exclusive or operation by \oplus .

Powers	Shift-Left P_2	Shift-Left P_1
$x^0 \otimes P_2$		
$x^1 \otimes P_2$		
$x^2 \otimes P_2$		
$x^3 \otimes P_2$		
$x^4 \otimes P_2$	0011100	
$x^5 \otimes P_2$	01000110	01000110
$P_1 \otimes P_2 = (00100111) \oplus (01001110) \oplus (01000110) = 00101111$		


Multiplication in $GF(2^m)$ is shift & XOR

Square operation in $GF(2^m)$

The **square** of the polynomial $a(x) \in GF(2^m)$ is given by

$$a(x)^2 = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} a_i x^{2i} \pmod{p(x)}.$$

The squaring essentially spreads out the input bits by **inserting zeroes** in between two bits.



Modular operation in $GF(2^m)$

The **modular operation** is the remainder produced when divided by the field's irreducible polynomial.

If a certain class of irreducible polynomials is used, the modular operation can be easily done.

Consider the irreducible trinomial $x^m + x^n + 1$, having a root α and $1 < n < \frac{m}{2}$. Therefore

$$\alpha^m + \alpha^n + 1 = 0,$$


$$\alpha^m = \alpha^n + 1,$$

$$\alpha^{m+1} = \alpha^{n+1} + \alpha,$$

$$\vdots$$


$$\alpha^{2m-3} = \alpha^{n+m-3} + \alpha^{m-3},$$

$$\alpha^{2m-2} = \alpha^{n+m-2} + \alpha^{m-2}.$$



Homomorphism

A group, ring or a field can be expressed in **several equivalent** forms.



For two groups, (G, o) and $(H, †)$, a **surjective function** $f: G \rightarrow H$ is said to be a **homomorphism** if and only if: $f(x o y) = f(x) † f(y)$.

Properties of Homomorphic Group

Theorem: If $f: G \rightarrow H$ is a group homomorphism then $f(e_1) = e_2$, where e_1 is the identity of G and e_2 is the identity of H .

Proof:....

Theorem: If $f: G \rightarrow H$ is a group homomorphism then for every $x \in G$, $f(x^{-1}) = f(x)^{-1}$.

Proof:.....

An **injective** (one-to-one) **homomorphism** is called an **isomorphism**.

Definition: Let $(R_1, +, \circ)$ and $(R_2, +', \circ')$ be rings and consider a surjective function, $f: R_1 \rightarrow R_2$. It is called a **ring isomorphism** if and only if:

- $f(a + b) = f(a) + 'f(b)$ for every a and b in R_1 .
- $f(a \circ b) = f(a) \circ 'f(b)$ for every a and b in R_1 .

Properties:

- 1) $f(0) = 0$ and $f(-x) = -f(x)$ for every $x \in R_1$.
- 2) $f(1) = 1'$ where 1 and $1'$ are multiplicative identities of R_1 and R_2 , respectively.
- 3) If x is a **unit** in R_1 , then $f(x)$ is a **unit** in R_2 , and $f(x^{-1}) = f(x)^{-1}$.

These also holds for fields.

Application:

The **isomorphism** is utilized to **transform** a given **field** into **another** isomorphic field

Perform operations in this field

Then **transform back** the solutions.

The **operations** in the **newer field** are more **efficient** to implement than the **initial field**.

Definition: The pair of the fields $GF(2^n)$ and $GF(2^n)^m$ are called a **composite field**, if there exists irreducible polynomials, $Q(Y)$ of degree n and $P(X)$ of degree m , which are used to extend $GF(2)$ to $GF(2^n)$, and $GF(2^n)^m$ from $GF(2^n)$.

A **composite field** is **isomorphic** to the field, $GF(2^k)$, where $k = m \times n$.

Example: Consider the fields $GF(2^4)$, elements of which are the following 16 polynomials with binary coefficients:

0	z^2	z^3	$z^3 + z^2$
1	$z^2 + 1$	$z^3 + 1$	$z^3 + z^2 + 1$
z	$z^2 + z$	$z^3 + z$	$z^3 + z^2 + z$
$z + 1$	$z^2 + z + 1$	$z^3 + z + 1$	$z^3 + z^2 + z + 1$

Irreducible polynomials of degree 4:

$$f_1(z) = z^4 + z + 1, f_2(z) = z^4 + z^3 + 1, f_3(z) = z^4 + z^3 + z^2 + z + 1.$$

The resulting fields, F_1, F_2, F_3 **all** have the **same** elements.

But the **operations** are **different** for example consider $z \cdot z^3$

Which is $z + 1$ in F_1 ,


$z^3 + 1$ in F_2 and

is $z^3 + z^2 + z + 1$ in F_3

The fields are isomorphic.

Hypothesis Testing

Motivation




NIST *Non-Invasive Attack Testing Workshop, 2011*

Goal: Establish testing methodology capable of robustly assessing the physical vulnerability of cryptographic devices.

This slide is courtesy of **Tobias Schneider**

Motivation

Perform state-of-the-art attacks on the device under test (DUT)



Problems:

- High computational complexity
- Requires lot of expertise
- Does not cover all possible attack vectors

This slide is courtesy of **Tobias Schneider**

Motivation

Standardization bodies intend to establish a **leakage assessment methodology**. One of such proposals is the **t-test** that is able to **relax** the **dependency** between the **evaluations** and the **device's** underlying **architecture**.

Advantages:

- Independent of architecture
- Independent of attack model
- Fast & simple

Problems:

- No information about hardness of attack
- Possible false positives if no care about evaluation setup

Question:

Whether **two sets of data** are significantly **different** from each other?


Hypothesis Testing


The **general goal** of a hypothesis test is to rule out chance (sampling error) as a plausible explanation for the **results from a research study**.

Hypothesis testing is a technique to help **determine** whether a **specific treatment** has an **effect** on the **individuals** in a population.


If the individuals in the sample are **noticeably different** from the individuals in the original population, we have evidence that the **treatment** has an **effect**.


However, it is also **possible** that the difference between the sample and the population is simply **sampling error**






The distribution of sample means
if the null hypothesis is true
(all the possible outcomes)







The **independent samples t-test** comes in two different forms:

The **standard Student's t-test**, which assumes that the **variance** of the two groups **are equal**.

The **Welch's t-test**, which is less restrictive compared to the original Student's test. This is the test where you **do not** assume that the **variance is the same** in the two groups, which results in the fractional degrees of freedom.


The **t-test** is used in situations where a researcher has **no prior knowledge** about either of the **two populations** (or treatments) being compared.

In particular, the **population means** and **standard deviations** are all **unknown**.


Because the population variances are not known, these values must be estimated from the sample data.

If two samples are taken from the **same population** and are given exactly the same treatment, there still will be **some difference** between the **sample means**. This difference is called **sampling error**.

Population A
Taught by method A



Population B
Taught by method B



The **general purpose** of the **t-test** is to determine whether the sample mean difference obtained in a research study **indicates a real mean difference** between the two populations (or treatments) or whether the **obtained difference** is simply the result of **sampling error**.

The **hypothesis test** provides a standardized, formal procedure for determining whether the **mean difference** obtained in a research study is significantly **greater than** can be explained by **sampling error**.

The hypothesis test follows four-step procedure.

1. State the hypotheses and **select an α level**. For the t-test, **H_0 states** that there is **no difference** between the two **population means**.
2. Locate the **critical region**. The critical values for the t statistic are obtained using **degrees of freedom** that are determined by adding together the df value for the first sample and the df value for the second sample.

3. Compute the test statistic

Let Q_0 and Q_1 indicate two sets which are under the test.

Let also μ_0 (resp. μ_1) and s_0^2 (resp. s_1^2) stand for the sample mean and sample variance of the set Q_0 (resp. Q_1), and n_0 and n_1 the cardinality of each set. The t -test statistic and the degree of freedom v are computed as

$$t = \frac{\mu_0 - \mu_1}{\sqrt{\frac{s_0^2}{n_0} + \frac{s_1^2}{n_1}}}$$

$$v = \frac{\left(\frac{s_0^2}{n_0} + \frac{s_1^2}{n_1}\right)^2}{\frac{\left(\frac{s_0^2}{n_0}\right)^2}{n_0 - 1} + \frac{\left(\frac{s_1^2}{n_1}\right)^2}{n_1 - 1}}$$

In cases, where $s_0 \approx s_1$ and $n_0 \approx n_1$, the degree of freedom can be estimated by $v = n_0 + n_1 = n$

4. **Make a decision.** We estimate the probability to accept the null hypothesis by means of Student's t distribution density function,


$$f(t, v) = \frac{\Gamma\left(\frac{v+1}{2}\right)}{\sqrt{\pi v} \Gamma\left(\frac{v}{2}\right)} \left(1 + \frac{t^2}{v}\right)^{-\frac{v+1}{2}}$$

Where $\Gamma(\cdot)$ denotes the gamma function and


the desired probability is calculated as

$$p = 2 \int_{|t|}^{\infty} f(t, v) dt$$

probability density function



cumulative distribution function



small p values (alternatively big t values) give evidence to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the sets were drawn from different populations.

For the sake of simplicity, usually a threshold $|t| > 4.5$ is defined to reject the null hypothesis without considering the degree of freedom and the aforementioned cumulative distribution function


specific t-test

Consider n associated data (plain text or cipher text) $D_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}}$.

n side-channel measurements (traces $T_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}}$) are collected.

The device under test operates with a **secret key** that is **kept constant**.

Each trace $T_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}}$ containing m sample points $\{t_i^{(1)}, \dots, t_i^{(m)}\}$.



The **non-specific t-test** examines the leakage of the DUT **without performing an actual attack**, and is in addition **independent** of its **underlying architecture**.

The test gives a level of confidence to conclude that the DUT has an exploitable leakage.

It indeed provides **no information** about the easiness/hardness of **an attack** which can exploit the leakage, nor about an appropriate intermediate value and the hypothetical model.


It can **easily** and **rapidly** report that the DUT **fails** to provide the desired **security level**, e.g., due to a mistake in the design engineering or a flaw in the countermeasure.

Non-specific t-test

A **fixed** associated data **D** is **preselected**.

A **coin** is flipped, and accordingly **D** **or** a **fresh-randomly** selected data is given to the DUT.

Side-channel measurements are collected.



The corresponding t-test is performed by categorizing the traces based on the associated data (D or random).

Such a test is also called **fixed** vs. **random** t-test.

If a **non-specific t-test** reports a **detectable leakage**, the **specific one** results in the same conclusion but with a **higher confidence**.

It may happen that a non-specific t-test by a **certain D** reports **no exploitable leakage**, but the same test using **another D** leads to the **opposite conclusion**.

Repeat a non-specific test with a **couple of different D** to avoid a false-positive conclusion.

The **non-specific t-test** can also be performed by **a set of particular** associated data ***D*** instead of **a unique D**. Such a non-specific t-test is also known as the **semi-fixed vs. random** test.

Question

